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The Fourth Revolution
Robert C. Power*

L Introduction
A small and secretive group of reactionary elderly men threatens
national security interests and obstructs the President of the United States m
his efforts to end a nationwide economic crisis. The group, generally known
by the apocalyptic allusion "Four Horsemen," has wrested effective control
of the national government from Congress and the President. In resistance,
an equally secretive group of progressive young men plots to restructure the
government to defeat the Four Horsemen. They fail miserably, and a key
leader dies under mysterious circumstances. Then, in a twist worthy of
O'Henry, the Four Horsemen fade away as it becomes evident that their
power was limited and transitory In a rather short period, the political
branches of the United States government regain trust, confidence, and
authority
It could be the latest Robert Ludlum or John Gnsham novel, but instead
it is the basic plot of William E. Leuchtenburg's The Supreme Court Reborn,' an engaging and fact-filled collection of essays about the constitutional
shift of the 1930s. Many books discuss this topic,2 and Professor Leuchtenburg does not really plow much new ground,3 at least in terms of legal
* Professor, Widener Umversity School of Law; J.D., Northwestern University;
A.B., Brown University. I would like to thank Alexander M. Meiklejohn and Margaret V
Sachs, who read an earlier version of this essay, and Emily Field Van Tassel, who lent me
her copy of The Supreme Court Reborn as soon as it arrived.
1.

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITU-

(1995). Professor Leuchtenburg is the
William Rand Kenan Professor of History at the Umversity of North Carolina Chapel Hill
and visiting professor of legal history at Duke Law School.
2. There are too many to mention. For a good bibliographic essay, see 1 ALFRED H.
KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONsTrruION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT A85-A90
(7th ed. 1991).
3. Most of the nine essays m The Supreme CourtReborn were re-edited from lectures
or articles. Each essay begins with a brief note describing previous versions. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 3, 26, 52, 82, 132, 163, 180, 213, 237 The preface also indicates
TIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT

1699

1700

52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1699 (1995)

analysis. Nevertheless, this is a splendid piece of work that should be
consulted by scholars, used in the classroom, and read by anyone who is
interested in the Court or the Constitution. This review summarizes the
book and then turns to three somewhat interrelated topics: (1) the significance of the constitutional changes of the 1930s, (2) their role in legal
education, and (3) the place of works such as The Supreme CourtReborn in
the ongoing discourse over storytelling and narrative in legal scholarship.
The book is a fine example of how effective storytelling can allow the
insights and techniques of one discipline - here history - to illuminate
another - law

II. Leuchtenburg'sStones
The nine essays in this book center on the Supreme Court's surprising
and significant transformation in 1937 An obstacle to the New Deal in 1935
and 1936, the Court was a partner in its reforms by March of 1937 The
essays tell a three-part story that underscores Leuchtenburg's theme that the
transformation was so dramatic as to be a rebirth. The three essays in the
first part, which one might call "the Bad Old Court," relate the stones of
Buck v Bell,4 RailroadRetirement Board v Alton Railroad Co. ,' and Humphrey 's Executor v United States,6 all pre-1937 cases in which reactionary
forces prevailed. The second part shifts from legal to political history The
focus of these two essays is President Roosevelt's development of the Courtpacking plan and Congress's reaction to that plan. The third part - "the
Good New Court" or "FDR Triumphant" - mixes the methods of the first
two parts. The first of its essays, the Perry Mason-sounding The Case of the
Wenatchee Chambermaid, returns to the style of the book's first part to
relate the story of West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish.7 Chapter seven then
returns to political history to tell of Justice Black's appointment to the Court.
The final two essays more generally evaluate the modem Court's actions.
The first gives a general overview of the Court's changes during the 1930s,
while the second is broader in time and scope, addressing the incorporation
doctrine from the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment through its nearly
complete implementation in the 1960s. The essays tie together remarkably
well, and much of this coherence is a result of Leuchtenburg's storytelling
the extent of Leuchtenburg's work on the New Deal era. See 1d. at vii-ix.
4. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
5. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
6. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
7 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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ability and his willingness to trim verbiage - skills which undoubtedly relate

to one another.8
A. The Bad Old Court
The Bad Old Court was the Court of the 1920s and the early 1930s,
dominated by the Four Horsemen - Pierce Butler, James McReynolds,
George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter. To prevail, of course, these
four justices had to convince at least one of their brethren to join their

decisions, which usually protected entrenched property interests against
governmental social or economic legislation based on their broad interpretation of constitutional rights. In some contexts, however, government was
allied with repressive interests. In such instances, the Four Horsemen

tended to support governmental action, sometimes joined by unlikely confederates. Buck v Bell was one of the latter cases - one in which these
reactionary justices were joined by putatively liberal justices in support of
repressive state action.9

Leuchtenburg's case study of Buck traces the eugemcs movement to
remind readers that Virginia's policy of sterilizing retarded persons was only
a small part of a major social movement.!' It also provides depressing data
about the compulsory sterilizations of the period, noting both the high
volume of such operations and their connection to similar policies in Nazi

Germany " Justice Holmes's majority opinion tnvialized the due process
8. Some additional tailoring would help in places. On a minor level, most of these
essays originally stood alone and, as a result, contain repetitive material. Because the essays
were modified for inclusion in this book, it would have seemed logical to edit out some of the
repetitive material. On a different level, chapter nine, The Birth ofAmenca's Second Bill of
Rights, is a disappointment, as addressed below. It does not fit well with the rest of the
essays, and its placement deprives the book of an effective conclusion. The irony here is that
this essay could have been neatly balanced with the opening essay on Buck v. Bell because
both topics involve clauns of individual, rather than economic, rights. Leuchtenburg effectively addresses the shift from close to deferential review of economic regulations, but only
hints at the more gradual, but equally Important, shift in the other direction for individual
rights. This essay could have provided a good exposition of this point, but it fails to include
a discussion of Buck or to provide much explanation for the relationship between the two
shifts.
9. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding Virgima law providing for compulsory sterilization of institutionalized, mentally impaired persons). The Four Horsemen did
not always vote together. Justice Butler, in fact, dissented in Buck. Id. at 208 (Butler, J.,
dissenting). However, the rest of the Court, including Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone,
unanimously ruled that a woman has no constitutional protection against state-ordered
sterilization. Id. at 205-08.
10. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 5-9.
11. Id. at 15-17
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and equal protection objections to compulsory sterilizations.12 More importantly, the Court did not merely acquiesce by suggesting that the Virginia
law was constitutional but represented an unwise policy, which would have

been consistent with a deferential jurisprudence. Leuchtenburg quotes
Walter Berns's statement that Holmes gave the movement "a constitutional
blessing and an epigrammatic battle cry ,13Leuchtenburg further notes that
although Holmes regularly voted to uphold state regulatory action, he did so

with particular pleasure m this case; the opinion is "an expression of his own
deeply felt convictions."" Thus, Buck disproves the notion that the Court
of this period was rights oriented in any principled way

By contrast, The Supreme CourtReborn portrays Justice Owen Roberts
to be a man without any deeply felt convictions. Chapter two, Mr Justice
Roberts and the Railroaders, discusses the Court's invalidation of the
Railroad Retirement Act of 1934.15 Roberts joined the Four Horsemen in

Alton,16 essentially to declare labor relations Immune from federal governmental interference. Although Alton is not one of the central cases of what
has become the New Deal canon," it provides a particularly apt example of

Leuchtenburg's theme about this Court. The majority "viewed the statute
12. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (characterizing due process challenge as attack only on
substantive law and characterizing claim of freedom from sterilization as "strange"); id. at
208 (describing equal protection challenge as "the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments").
13. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Walter Berns, Buck v Bell: Due
ProcessofLaw?, 6 W POL.Q. 762, 762 (1953)). That cry, of course, is "[t]hree generations
of imbeciles are enough." Buck, 274 U.S. at 207
14. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 18.

15. Railroad Retirement Act, ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934) (invalidated by Railroad
Retirement Bd. v Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935)).
16. Railroad Retirement Bd. v Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (declaring
unconstitutional compulsory retirement and pension plan, established by Railroad Retirement
Act of 1934, as applied to carriers covered by Interstate Commerce Act).
17 Most casebooks include one or two mid-1930s commerce clause decisions. Usually
included are Carter v Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), some note materials on the shift, and some
combination of Wickard v Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), United States v Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941), and NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See, e.g.,
JEROME A. BARRoN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW" PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 95-106 (4th ed.
1992); DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW" STRucTuRE AND RIGHTS IN OUR
FEDERAL SYSTEM

TIONAL LAW

345-59 (2d ed. 1991) (omitting Wickard); GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTrru-

115-36 (12th ed. 1991); WILLIAM B.

LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

94-112 (7th ed. 1991); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 167-94 (2d ed.

1991). The usual treatments of the spending power and due process, see infra notes 42-46,
are less overtly historical.
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from the perspective of someone seated m a railway [board room]," 18 which
was, in fact, where Roberts had sat prior to joining the Court. 9 The opinion
revealed "contempt both for the legislators who had created this monstrosity
and for the attorneys who sought to persuade the Court that it was a
legitimate exercise of the powers of Congress."I The majority found that
this type of retirement system required redistribution of wealth, which made
it a violation of due process, but then went on, unnecessarily, to declare such
legislation not a regulation of interstate commerce.2" Although other cases
were more directly devastating to the New Deal, as a matter of logic, Alton
was particularly troublesome because it repudiated the underlying methodology of the planned social security system and separately indicated that
congressional authority over unquestionably interstate businesses was lacking
in matters not directly involved m interstate transportation. The dissenters
recognized the need for a strong response if effective national regulation
were to survive the Four Horsemen. 22
Before turning to President Roosevelt's response, Leuchtenburg deviates slightly by telling one more story of the Bad Old Court - its rejection
of President Roosevelt's dismissal of the Federal Trade Commission's
William E. Humphrey ' The heroes and villains of that story are more
ambiguous than those of the earlier case studies, perhaps because nobody
today remembers Commissioner Humphrey and because the decision remains
"good law "24 Leuchtenburg reveals that Humphrey was a sharply partisan
18. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 36.

19. Justice Roberts had served as counsel for the Pennsylvania Railroad.

FRED

RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLrTICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955,

at 31 (1955); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 211 (expanded ed. 1988). Still, it would be unfair to characterize

Roberts as a representative of "corporate America," as is sometimes implied by critical
commentaries. Roberts worked m a variety of public and private legal positions, capped by
his work as a special prosecutor m the Teapot Dome oil scandals of the Harding administration. David Burner, Owen J. Roberts, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIvES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2253, 2254-55 (Leon Friedman &
Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
20. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 37
21. See id. at 35-37 (discussing Alton).
22. Leuchtenburg addresses Chief Justice Hughes's dissent at length. Id. at 39-42. The
essay then effectively summarizes the largely antagonistic media responses to the decision,

emphasizmg speculation about Justice Roberts's presidential ambitions. Id. at 42-48. It
concludes by discussing the administration's reaction and foreshadowing the Court-packing
plan. Id. at 49-51.
23. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
24.

Leuchtenburg does err when he suggests that this case has drawn little attention.
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republican opponent of business regulation and that the Court's assumption
that there was no good cause for his firing was largely a fiction caused by
Roosevelt's ill-advised choice to use a simple, nonexplanatory letter of dismissal.1 The Court's decision was unanimous and, coming as it did on May
27, 1935 - during the administration's worst year m the Court and on the
same day as other notable anti-New Deal decisions,' represented a serious
obstacle to the New Deal. The President reacted strongly "The Humphrey
ruling went far to persuade the President that, sooner or later, he would have
to take bold action against a Court that, from personal anmus, was determined to embarrass him and to destroy his program."'7 Roosevelt's anger
over the Humphrey decision may have influenced his choice of methods to
change the Court's direction.'
B. The President'sResponse
The centerpiece of this book consists of Leuchtenburg's two essays on
the Court-packing plan. The first of these essays is a richly detailed recitation of the steps leading up to the 1937 proposal to increase the number of
Supreme Court justices. This essay reveals the extent of Roosevelt's disdain
for the Court - disdain that predated his election in 1932.29 Most of the
essay, however, concerns the period that began with the January 1935
invalidation of the "hot oil" laws in Panama Refining Co. v Ryan' and
See LEuCHTENBuRG, supra note 1, at 52. The case remains a major discussion point of
administrative law courses and theory, particularly because the theory of the unitary executive
has become popular. Humphrey's Executor's acknowledgment of independent agencies

remains one of the major obstacles to that theory's success. See Synar v United States, 626
F Supp. 1374, 1396-1402 (D.D.C.) (addressing Humphrey's Executor), aff'd sub nom.,

Bowsher v Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724-25 (1986) (same).
25. LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 53-55, 59, 68. The conventional wisdom was that
the Court would uphold the firing as an aspect of the President's executive power; this notion
was based on the Court's strong opinion recognizing such authority with respect to local
postmasters. See Myers v United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); see also LEUCHTENBURG,
supra note 1, at 64-69. Under this view, there was no need for the President to justify the
firing or otherwise to comply with the statutory standards for dismissal. The conflict between
Myers and Humphrey'sExecutor remains an issue today
26. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking
down National Industrial Recovery Act); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v Radford, 295
U.S. 555 (1935) (striking down Frazier-Lenike Act).
27 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 79.
28. See rd. at 78-81 (discussing Humphrey's Executor as impetus for Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan).

29. Id. at 83.
30. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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ended m February 1937, when the Court-packing plan was announced. The
May 27, 1935 trio of adverse Supreme Court decisions apparently served as
the catalyst for the plan. Several days after these decisions, President
Roosevelt met with reporters to discuss the Court's failings, emphasizing
that "[w]e have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate
commerce." 3 Attorney General Homer S. Cummings and other officials
began considering various means of solving the administration's problem
with the Court. They kicked around various proposals to amend the Constitution, from expanding federal authority m various respects, to ending life
tenure for justices, to cutting back on Supreme Court jurisdiction.32 This
discussion alternates with a parallel discussion of Court opinions issued
during this period that were hostile to economic regulation.33 The plan
eventually chosen - adding another member to the Court for each justice
over seventy years old who chose not to retire - was a fairly late player m
the game.' 4 Its two-pronged gemus was that it could be enacted through
simple legislation rather than a constitutional amendment, and it did not
directly challenge the justices on the merits of any particular constitutional
interpretation. Rather, it could be presented as a docket-management
reform. Leuchtenburg details the final drafting process by Justice Department and White House advisors and concludes the first essay on Courtpacking with the President's deliberate decision to announce the plan on
February 5, 1937 - several days before the Court was scheduled to hear
oral arguments on the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act.35
That choice was portentous, for the fate of the Court-packing plan and the
New Deal was ultimately tied to the Court's unexpected approval of that Act
in all of its applications.36
31. LEuCHrtENBURG, supranote 1, at 90 (quoting 4 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEvELT, The Two
Hundred Ninth Press Conference, May 31, 1935, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEvELT: THE COURT DISAPPROVES, 1935, at 200, 221 (Samuel I. Rosenman
ed., 1938)); see also Franklyn Waltman, Jr., Roosevelt Sees Social Setback of 50 Years in
Court Decision; Calls on People to Face Crisis, WASH. POST, June 1, 1935, at 1.
32. They were not alone. Congress was also considerng Court-curbing bills at this
time. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 102-03.

33. See Morehead v New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (invalidating New
York's mmmnum wage law for women and children); Carter v Carter Coal, Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); United States v Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural Adjustment Act's processing tax).
34. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 117-22 (discussing development of Courtpacking plan).

35. Id. at 122-27, 129-30.
36. See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Four other cases
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Leuchtenburg's second essay on the Court-packing plan weaves together
the various responses to the plan by members of Congress, the public, the
media, and the Court. From the outset, strong opposition existed, some of it
unexpected, but Roosevelt remained optimistic about the plan's chances.
Three events combined to change things. First, the Court issued decisions
favorable to New Deal initiatives.37 Justice Roberts joined the majority in
each case, isolating the Four Horsemen in dissent. Second, in May, Justice
Van Devanter announced his resignation.3" These events gave the progressive
forces a practical victory on the underlying controversies over federal and
state regulatory powers, wich lessened the willingness of many members of
Congress to take the political risks of supporting the Court-packing plan.
Third, Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson of Arkansas, who had been
expected to be the first Roosevelt appointee to the Court, died suddenly one
week after the beginning of the debate over the Court-packing plan.39 The
death of the popular Robinson lessened Senate confidence in the "replacement" justices and strengthened the position of democratic party opponents of
the plan, which they quietly shelved by recommitment to the Judiciary
Committee.' Leuchtenburg concludes the essay with a series of observations
about the harmful effects of the Court-packing plan on Roosevelt's relations
with Congress and other tangible costs of this odd constitutional revolution.4
C. The Good New Court
The final group of essays emulates the first group by addressing specific
events that illustrate a larger theme. It begins with the story of West Coast
Hotel Co. v Parrish,which presaged the New Deal's newfound success in the
Supreme Court. Pamsh provides a prime example of the Court's shift. Less
than a year previously, in Morehead v New York ex rel. Tipaldo,42 the Court
had struck down a minimum wage law from New York.43 In Parsh,howdecided the same day upheld the Wagner Act's application to a variety of sizes and types of
business enterprises. See Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v NLRB, 301 U.S. 142
(1937); Associated Press v NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937).
37 This began with West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), continued
a few weeks later with the NLRB cases, see supra note 36, and reached its natural conclusion
six weeks later m Steward Mach. Co. v Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
38.

LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 143-44.

39

Id. at 150-52.

40. See rd. at 144-53.
41. Id. at 156-62.
42. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
43. Morehead v New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609-18 (1936).
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ever, the Court upheld Washington's minimum wage for chambermaids,
overruling Morehead and admitting that much of its existing jurisprudence
was based upon a crabbed notion of the state police power. 44 Leuchtenburg

notes that although many contemporary observers failed to appreciate the
significance of Pamsh, the Four Horsemen, m dissent, recognized the sea
change that the decision represented.4' The chapter concludes with reflections
on the practical impact of the Court's action and musings about the role of a
chambermaid m changing American history '
A Kkansman Joins the Court is Leuchtenburg's essay on the appointment
of Justice Hugo Black to replace Justice Van Devanter. Leuchtenburg ably
organizes the multitudinous materials on Black to reveal the extent and the
depth of ammosity that the nomination produced.47 Tis animosity ranged

from widespread disrespect for Black's intelligence to concerns about his
temperament and rumors that he was anti-Catholic, as well as the fact that he
had Ku Klux Klan connections. It is easy now to look back bemusedly on the
Black affair and note how wrong is detractors turned out to be about his
44. Pamsh, 300 U.S. at 395-400 (directly overruling Adkins v Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) by concluding that it was inconsistent with precedent and series of later
cases that more accurately described nature of state regulatory power). Assembling language
and applications from a variety of cases, the Court flatly repudiated the notion that the Constitution provides any special freedom of contract. See id. at 391-98. Rather, the applicable
protection is "liberty," as recognized in the due process clauses, and "regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due
process." Id. at 391.
45. See LEUCHTENBuRG, supra note 1, at 173-75. Leuchtenburg properly sets the scene
in detail. His description begins:
The author of Adkins surveyed the chamber silently, almost diffidently, then picked
up the sheaf of papers in front of him and began to read. Sensing his day had passed,
Sutherland - who, with is pince-nez, high collar, goatee, and hair parted in the
nmddle, seemed never to have left the nineteenth century - appeared barely able to
brng himself to carry out his futile assignment. He started off speaking in a curiously
toneless murmur, and even those near the dais had trouble at first catching his words.
Id. at 173. The entire description underscores the notion that the Four. Horsemen knew this
was the case that destroyed their hold on the Court. By this point, of course, all members
of the Court were probably aware that Pamsh was just the first of a series of New Deal
victories, but the public remained in suspense for several more weeks.
46. Id. at 178-79.
47 See id. at 184-99. There are, of course, a variety of books and many law review
articles about Justice Black. The most recent one to have received substantial praise is
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994). See also GERALD T. DUNNE,
HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); JOHN P FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK:
THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONs (1977); HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSIUM
(Stephen P. Strickland ed., 1967); JAMES F SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX
FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA (1989).
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approach to constitutional questions and yet recognize that a person with his
background probably would not be appointed today a Still, this essay is
essentially an engaging, nonanalytical walk through the nomination process.49
The key to its significance lies in its final topic - why President Roosevelt
chose Black. It "was a symbolic and defiant act" that "afforded the President
another opportuity to express hs contempt for the illusion that the Court was
a body that lived on Mount Olympus."5° Black's appointment set the pattern
for what soon became the Roosevelt Court.
Many of the earlier essays' topics are restated in summary form in
Leuchtenburg's penultimate essay, The ConstitutionalRevolution of 193751
Its first few pages summarize the legislative initiatives of the New Deal,
the Court's initial hostility, and its 1937 decisions that began the transforma-

tion.52 The bulk of the chapter discusses the cases that nailed down the new

view of federal authority Some of the cases are the old warhorses of constitutional law courses, such as United States v Darby53 and Wickard v
48. Leuchtenburg notes the irony of Justice Black's role m expanding civil liberties
given his Klan background. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 202-04. Leuchtenburg
does not take the opportunity of contrasting Roosevelt's action to the modem practice of
naming "stealth" or noncontroversial centrists to the Court, nearly perfected by Presidents
Bush and Clinton. This may be because this essay began as a lecture m 1973, long before
the practice began.
49. Leuchtenburg reminds his readers of an odd turn of events that accompanied the
Black nomination. At the outset, supporters of the nomination apparently anticipated that
Black would receive the traditional senatorial courtesy of immediate confirmation. This
attempt to end run the usual confirmation process was frustrated by Vice President John
Nance Gamer, who kept asking for objections from the floor until he received some, which
forced the matter to committee consideration under Senate rules. Id. at 184. Despite substantial controversy over the Klan connection and Black's intellectual and personal qualifications,
the nomination moved quickly through committee, and Black was confirmed less than a week
after he had been named. See id. at 184-90. It seems unlikely that even a unversally
respected member of the Senate could be confirmed to the Supreme Court so quickly today
50. Id. at210-11.
51. The last essay concerns the development of the incorporation doctrine, which
occurred mostly from the 1940s through the 1960s. Although the need for judicial activism
in the area of rights is foreshadowed m some of the earlier chapters, this essay seems tacked
on and detracts from the overall theme of the book. It is, however, a wholly competent and
exceptionally readable account of the development of the incorporation doctrine. It addresses
in sufficient detail most of the key cases, and it identifies the underlying premises of judicial
activism concerning fundamental rights. As such, it would make a good reading assignment
on incorporation m a basic constitutional law or criminal procedure course. However, it does
not fit well with the rest of this book, which is about the dramatic shift of constitutional
interpretation that occurred in a very short period in the 1930s.

52. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 213-20.
53.

312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding constitutionality of Fair Labor Standards Act of
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Filburn,M but a number of less well-known cases are intriguingly discussed
as well. These include Mulford v Smth,5s which acknowledged federal
control over agnculture because of its effects on interstate commerce, 56
Kirschbaum v Walling, s' which recognized the interstate commerce aspects
of seemingly -local businesses,"8 and Osborn v Ozlin, 9 which reinvigorated
deference to state economic policies.' ° The Court was also more expansive
in its treatment of governmental powers outside the realm of constitutional
interpretation, as illustrated in the four Morgan6 1 cases, which reveal a shift
over time to Court deference to administrative agency decisions.62 Leuchten-

burg's essay propounds the unexceptional notion that these changes were revolutionary, and he is generally and genuinely praising of the Court's actions.
He does, however, recognize the potential mischief of an unduly deferential
Court and the need for stability in constitutional interpretation.63 The
structure of the book prevents Leuchtenburg from including a conclusion that

brings everything together. 64 This essay may be the best option given what
1938).
54. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as within
commerce power of Congress).
55. 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
56. Mulford v Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1-939).
57 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
58. Kirschbaum v Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523-28 (1942).
59. 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
60. Osborn v Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 (1940).
61. The Morgan litigation represents the Jarndyce v. Jarndyce of administrative law.
See CHARLES DIcKENs, BLEAK HoUSE (1853). The case began with a Department of
Agriculture rate-making proceeding m 1930 concerning the Kansas City Stockyards. It
turned into four Supreme Court decisions, each reversing what one suspects was an increasingly irritated district judge. Morgan v United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (Morgan 1);
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1937) (MorganIf); United States v Morgan, 307 U.S.
183 (1939) (Morgan1i); United States v Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (MorganIV). The
cases concerned the scope and methodology of administrative adjudications and suggest the
Court's shift from a formal to a practical response to the nature of government admimstration. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WiLLiAm T. MAYTON, ADMINSTRATivE LAW § 8.5.1
(1993) (discussing four Morgan cases).
62. LEUCHTENBuRG, supranote 1, at 227
63. Id. at 231-36.
64. The biggest flaw in this book is its failure to address, m a coherent fashion, the
relationship between the switch to greater deference m the economic sphere and the switch
to less deference in the area of individual rights. This failure is problematic, for the tools are
certainly there, as the opening (Buck v. Belt) and closing (incorporation) essays concern
individual rights. Leuchtenburg could have discussed whether these reverse shifts were
justified, as he apparently believes, or why they occurred at roughly the same period, which
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we now know to be a continuing tradition of constantly changing constitutional law
III. The Significance of 1937

In my constitutional law class, I tell my students that there were four
American revolutions. The first was the 1776.war that they vaguely recall
from high school. Second, a bloodless, but still revolutionary movement
followed that ultimately produced the Constitution of 1787 The Civil War,

which "interpreted" the Constitution to prohibit voluntary withdrawals from
the Union and resulted in three key constitutional amendments, was an
obvious third revolution. Finally, the 1937 transformation of the Court was
the fourth revolution, and we still live under its regime.'

Constitutional law casebooks regularly revisit the fourth revolution. It
marks, of course, the switch from the narrow, cabined notion of the federal
commerce power66 to the nearly all-encompassing notion embodied in modern cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States67 and Perez
v United States.6" We see it again in the substantive due process materials,
is less obvious. He may have felt that attempting to resolve these matters would be outside
his realm of telling history Regardless, his insistence on just telling the story is one of this
book's strengths. See infra part V
65. There are some concerns that we may be at the brink of a counterrevolution m this
regard. The main support is the Court's recent decision striking down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act on commerce clause grounds. United States v Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
The fact that four justices voted to uphold state authority to impose term limits on congressional representatives from that state, see United States Term Limits, Inc. v Thornton,
115 S. Ct. 1842, 1913-14 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), may also indicate a shift. See generally Aaron Epstein, States' Rights Gaming Ground with Supreme Court, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, May 28, 1995, at D2 (noting that advocates of enhanced states' rights are only one
vote away from reshaping federal-state relationship); Linda Greenhouse, Blowing the Dust
offthe Constitutionthat Was, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, at 4-1 (summarizing Court's recent
steps toward return to states' rights); Linda Greenhouse, Focus on FederalPower, N.Y
TIMES, May 24, 1995, at Al (noting emergence of Court's debate over extent of federal
power under Constitution). As suggested m this section, however, I do not expect any such
shift to gut or even to narrow, in important respects, the scope of congressional power.
66. The taxing and spending powers see the same transition. For example, compare
United States v Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (striking down processing tax of Agriculture
Adjustment Act of 1933, with Four Horsemen and Justice Butler joining in majority) to
Steward Mach. Co. v Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937) (upholding social security unemployment compensation, with only Four Horsemen dissenting).
67 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding public accommodations provisions of 1964
Civil Rights Act).
68. 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (upholding commerce clause jurisdiction over "local"
loansharking).

THE FOURTHREVOLUTION

1711

as the result m Adans v Children'sHospital69 transforms into the opposite
result of West Coast Hotel Co. v Pamsh.7' Those of us who teach
administrative law also see evidence of the fourth revolution as our classes
discuss the evolution from specific delegations in the National Industrial
Recovery Act cases of 1935 to the compliant "search for intelligible
principles" of more recent cases. 7 ' It is commonplace, if not trite, to suggest
that we would be living in a different nation today without the Court's shift
of 1937, but such observation is nonetheless accurate. Those who are
distressed with the nation's present condition may suppose that the Court's
shift was a mistake. The currently fashionable federal bashing over
regulation, for example, seems premised on a notion that state governments
are more efficient than the federal government and that state regulations are
more responsive to public needs. Further, the movement to reform welfare
programs reveals a belief that President Johnson's "great society" was,
despite its intent, a blueprint for depriving the underclass of ambition and
principle. For those who believe that the Supreme Court led us into such
horrible missteps (and election returns suggest that they number in the
millions), the Four Horsemen are not the cardboard villains of constitutional
histories, but rather the romantic heroes of a lost war.
Even if the critics of federal regulation and public welfare programs are
essentially correct as a matter of policy,' however, the Four Horsemen were
wrong as a matter of constitutionallaw Whatever had been the intent or
expectation of the framers (whomever we precisely mean by that term), the
nation's economy changed over time from primarily local, to primarily
69. 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) (striking down District of Columbia's minmum wage for
women).
70. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v Children's Hospital by upholding
Washington's minimum wage law).
71. Early cases include A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 U.S.
495, 542 (1935) (striking down fair competition codes of National Industrial Recovery Act
as unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to president) and Panama Refining Co. v
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (invalidating portion of National Industrial Recovery Act as
excessive delegation of legislative power to executive branch). Modem cases include Mistretta v United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (upholding Congress's delegation of
authority to United States Sentencing Commission) and Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
677 (1988) (upholding Congress's authority under Ethics in Government Act to place appointment authority for independent counsel outside executive branch).
72. I disagree with most of the criticism, believing instead that regulation on a nationwide basis is required in many areas and that welfare programs are a necessary and worthwhile cost of an essentially free market economy. This section assumes, however, that the
critics are correct and that Congress and the states have been too expansive in using their
powers.
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regional, to primarily national. As a result of these changes, most business
regulation became, as a practical matter, regulation of interstate commerce,
and neither Congress nor the Court needs to engage in legal fictions to
permit national regulation of virtually any commercial activity I For
different reasons, the scope of the spending power, which underlies most
entitlement programs, cannot reasonably be narrowed to prohibit social
spending. The broad scope of this power dates from the earliest days of the
nation.74 Of equal importance to the new conservative textualists, the openended language of the spending clause plainly gives Congress powers beyond
those enumerated in the remaining paragraphs of Article I, Section 8.75 The
73. See supranote 65 (discussing United States v Lopez, in which Court struck down,
on commerce clause grounds, Congress's criminal ban on gun possession in vicinity of
school). Although the majority and concurring opinions question the propriety of the nearly
unlimited commerce clause power of existing case law, their fundamental rationale is that
Congress never articulated a connection between the prohibited action - gun possession near
a school - and interstate commerce. United States v Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1642, 1631-32
(1995). That deficiency can be remedied for virtually any type of business regulation, perhaps even for guns in school zones, see id. at 1632 n.4, and pass muster under principles such
as cumulative effects on interstate commerce, see Wickard v Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942) (concluding that individual effects on commerce can be added together for all similarly
situated persons to create substantial effect), or ripple effects on interstate transactions, see
Perez v United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (concluding that intrastate activities may
affect interstate commerce).
74. The Louisana Purchase would seem to be an early example. See THE READER'S
COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 681-82 (Eric Foner & John A. Garaty eds., 1991)
(noting that critics found no constitutional authority for purchasing territory, but that
President Jefferson took uncharacteristically broad view on question). In Massachusetts v
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court upheld Congress's allocation of funds for maternal
and infant health. Id. at 480. It concluded that no unenumerated power of regulation had
.been exercised because the state acceptance of funds was voluntary and that general welfare
spending is permissible under Article I of the Constitution. Id., see also Eric S&hnapper,
Affirmative Action and the LegislativeHistory of the FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA. L. REV
753, 754-83 (1985) (addressing federal statutes providing public benefits in post-Civil War
era, most of which appear to be constitutionally permissible only as spending for general
welfare purposes).
75. Although the precise meaning of the Taxing and Spending Clause has always been
controversial, those who are committed to textual interpretation must take cognizance of the
fact that taxes are to be used to "provide for the
general welfare," U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1, among other uses. If the language limiting federal authority is to be followed, as
textualists insist, then this language, which imposes a limitation of means (spending as
opposed to regulation) along with a general description of ends (general welfare), should also
be followed, which results in a very wide range of objectives for congressional spending.
The only more restrictive interpretation conceivable - that the phrase should be interpreted
to allow spending only in support of powers enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution should be untenable to textualists as surplusage, given that the Necessary and Proper Clause
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only effective limitation crafted to date flowed from the tortured logic of the
commerce power limitation enunciated in United States v Butler 76 This
limitation necessarily disappeared along with the artificial notion of a rigid
line between interstate and intrastate commerce.
To the extent that the post-1937 Court is criticized for ignoring the
preferred position of liberty of contract via its substantive due process junsprudence, that criticism is equally myopic. The period of judicial hostility
to state regulation of business practices was short and unjustified by reference to the United States Constitution.' Largely a creation of romantic
nineteenth-century notions of individualism, this view never formed a part
of the basis for our national government and cannot be justified under any
credible interpretive methods.78 More significantly for the people who
purport to oppose federal intervention, supporting aggressive use of the due
process, or other, clauses by federal courts against state regulation is really
sleeping with the enemy If state authority is truly superior to federal authority, it is plainly wrong-headed for the federal courts to obstruct decisions
made by democratically elected state legislatures.
What really seems to bother the new conservative movement is that
Congress has overused or misused its powers, many of which it shares with
the states for all practical purposes. The 1937 shift did not mandate misuse.
Rather, it simply transferred most of the keys of government from the
federal judiciary to the political branches. The cases of the Good New Court
do not say that "more federal regulation is good" or even that "more
regulation is good." Instead, the cases allocate from the judicial branch to
other entities the critical decision-makmg power. Those entities, by and
large, are Congress - by way of a more realistic interpretation of the coinalso allows'such spending by necessary implication. In any event, even the Four Horsemen
rejected the more restrictive view m United States v Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1936).
76. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
77 See, for example, FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTiE DUE PROCESS OF LAw 79-113
(1986) and sources cited therein. See also LAURENCE H. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 565-68 (2d ed. 1988). Of course, this lack of a federal constitutional protection does
not rule out the possibility that state constitutions may be interpreted to limit business
regulation at the state level, either through specific provisions or more demanding notions of
general protections, such as htate due process or equal protection guarantees.
78. There are credible historical and legal arguments to support varying degrees of
judicial protection of private property and contractual freedom under the due process, takings,
contracts, and privileges and immumities clauses, but none of these arguments prevents the
national government from regulating for consumer protection or from spending to help the
less fortunate. Such limitations would, at most, exclude some techniques or subjects, but
would not prohibit close federal involvement in the economy or society
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merce power, administrative agencies - by way of a pragmatic notion of
legislative delegation, and state legislatures - by way of a greatly reduced
substantive due process protection.
This reallocation is by far the most important thing that the Roosevelt
Court accomplished. The view that it meant "bigger" government conflates
cause and effect. Government expanded because the Court interpreted the
Constitution to allow the people to make that choice, and the people took it.79
It now appears that the people are inclined to make a different choice, at
least m some areas. They can do so only because the Supreme Court
decided in 1937 to give them the powers both to make that choice and to
change their minds.
IV Teaching the Shift
The foregoing discussion indicates that the Constitution, at least as
currently interpreted, makes few judgments about what the federal or state
governments should do. Rather, it assigns decision-making authority among
the branches of the national government, the states, and the people. This
idea is the underlying premise of most basic law school courses m constitutional law Most law students, however, do not fully grasp this concept until
some years after they take the course, if even then,' which may be a good
thing. For example, it might suck the blood from a philosophical discussion
of the value of artistic freedom m a diverse society to note flatly that the
First Amendment merely establishes that decisions about the content of communications are allocated to individuals rather than to the federal or state
government. Yet the realization would also clarify several things. First, it
would clarify the notion that those who defend a person's right to commumcate something unpleasant - pornography or violent entertainment, for example - do not necessarily endorse the message. Most law students see this
79. It is no coincidence that Congress and many states chose to increase business
regulation and expand public benefit programs during the Depression and World War II. The
fact that public policies have shifted m the ensuing 50 years should come as no surprise, but
it is likely that they will shift again and that a new national emergency will someday result
m an increase m national legislation. The present Court, unlike the Bad Old Court, is likely
to uphold such legislation.
80. My favorite law school course was offered at Yale Law School by Professor
Charles L. Black, Jr. Its description was: "Constitutional Law Revisited. 3 units. This course
will give its members a chance to take a second look at constitutional law, this time after
considerable law training. No attempt will be made to avoid covering cases, problems, or
doctrines already considered in Constitutional Law I. On the contrary " YALE LAW SCHOOL,
BULLETIN OF YALE UNIvERsITY, Aug. 20, 1985, at 48. I suspect that most constitutional law
professors would love to teach this course.
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easily enough, although the idea is too often lost on society m general.
Second, this "jurisdictional" notion of what the First Amendment does makes
it possible to recognize that vocal demonstrations m opposition to such
unpleasant speech, or even to generally accepted speech that is distasteful to
the demonstrators alone, is equally protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, expression that criticizes, or even calls for privately boycotting,
books, movies, or political speech is itself protected speech rather than the
censorship that it is often condemned to be by those who do not really
understand the way the First Amendment works. Law students, as well as
laypersons, find it difficult to grasp this point. Therefore, a central objective
of the constitutional law course is to communicate this notion of the way the
Constitution works.
Close attention to the shift of 1937 and use of materials such as The
Supreme Court Reborn can help us to teach and understand this aspect of
constitutional law It is too easy to fall into the trap of teaching the course
as the casebooks lay it out for us - some introduction on judicial review,
then congressional powers (highlighting the commerce clause), then limitations on state powers as a result of national power (emphasizing the dormant
commerce clause because it is doctrinal, rather than preemption, which is
necessarily case-by-case), 1 then separation of powers. ' If the class is not
bored to death by the time we finish with these topics, we serve dessert 81. Dormant commerce clause analysis fits the traditional case method's emphasis on
building up a body of principles through close examination of the facts of a series of cases.
Those principles should resolve future cases without requiring a complete re-examination of
the earlier cases. For example, m Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), the
court was able to pare down "the general rule that emerges" from the dormant commerce
clause to a fairly straightforward test three sentences long. See id. at 142. By contrast,
preemption cases are governed by one overriding rule - congressional intention. Although
the Court has developed some techmques for identifying congressional intent, see, e.g.,
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983), most preemption cases turn into an exhaustive, and usually exhausting,
examination of the particulars of the statutory scheme(s) at issue. See, e.g., Cipollone v
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 513-31 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v McClendon, 498
U.S. 133, 137-45 (1990); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205-23.
82. See supra note 17 (listing multiple constitutional law casebooks that all follow this
structure to substantial degree). Not all casebooks follow this format, however. For
example, one textbook devotes roughly its first third to an historical survey before breaking
the rest of the text down into chapters that resemble the traditional approach. See PAUL
BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERiALS (3d ed. 1992). Another text is somewhat less experimental, but it largely
reverses the tradition, beginning with equal protection and moving toward judicial review.

See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTfIrTIONAL LAW" THEMES
FOR THE CONSTrrU'rON's THIRD CENTuRY (1993).
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fundamental rights, equal protection, and maybe a little First Amendment.
In fact, boring the class may be the whole point. Only future constitutional

law professors can make it to the second half of the course with any appetite
for more constitutional law, so perhaps we have somehow chosen to reproduce by saving the "good parts" for our own kind.
The fact that we keep returning to the mid-1930s as a crucial period m
several of these doctrines is regularly noted, both in print, and in class.

However, the class reference is rarely more than a sarcastic comment about
the fickle Mr. Justice Roberts, a wink at the frailty of precedent, and a sigh
about the Bad Old Court. Why do the casebooks fail to do a better and more
thorough analysis of this pivotal event? Perhaps it is because these cases are
dry, often dealing with details of business regulation and standards of
judicial review We are like our students in wanting to proceed to the good
parts, so too often we exacerbate the problem and treat these- immensely
important issues and this vital period as just some "stuff" we have to get
through.

We can mitigate the problem by teaching more American history with
our constitutional law The Supreme Court Reborn provides us with the
underlying concept, a set of materials, and a central mystery with a number
of discussion points. The underlying concept, of course, is that the 1937
shift marked a sea change in constitutional law and that the individual cases
were just part of a larger, more coherent pattern. The book clearly establishes that it certainly was not mere coincidence that led to deferential review

under several different constitutional provisions and, at the same time,
avoids oversimplistic explanations such as "legal realism allows judges to be

inconsistent. "' Confrontations are the key to constitutional development.
83. Each of the casebooks mentioned in note 17, supra, takes note of this event m a
similar fashion. See BARRON ET AL., supra note 17, at 95-97 (entitled The New Deal Confrontation);BRAVEMEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 349-51 (discussing notes about plan and
shift, and citing to Leuchtenburg's essay about Court-packing plan); GUNTHER, supra note
17, at 122-24 (placing notes on Court-packing plan among standard cases); LOCKHART ET
AL., supra note 17, at 94-100 (entitled Backgroundfor ConstitutionalStruggle: The New Deal
vs. The GreatDepressionand Backgroundfor a JudicialReversal of Position); STONE ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 178-81 (citing to earlier version of Leuchtenburg's essay about Courtpacking plan and including notes between cases on constitutional themes, attack on Court, and
Roberts switch).
84. This is essentially what we do when we wink at the shift and make some simple
cause-and-effect assertion. This confrontation about fundamental aspects of our governmental
system deserves more respect. There are a number of potential causes to discuss, and there
are probably an equal number of subsidiary questions to address, the separation of powers
aspects of the Court-packing plan being only the most obvious.
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The year 1937 brought the most direct confrontation in our history between
the judiciary and the political branches, and it was the judiciary that
blinked.' The struggle took place on several fronts, prompted by disputes

between real parties. Leuchtenburg's discussion of Alton, for example, is
particularly useful for explaining the stakes of these constitutional squabbles
to individuals and, by extension, to millions of workers. The Pamsh essay

serves the same purpose and, by discussing the series of state regulation
cases that preceded it, brings home how suddenly and sharply the Court

reversed itself on substantive due process. The Buck v Bell essay provides
disturbing facts that make that decision even colder, if that is possible. The

essays on Court packing and the nomination of Justice Black place the Court
and its action in the context of the period's politics and explore the constitutional relevance of a change in personnel.6

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the topic and this set of materials
is that the questions multiply and do not permit short answers. Given what
happened over this period, one major question to ponder is something like:
"Justice Roberts - was he pushed, did he jump, or did he just fall?"

However, tis question merely describes one whole series of questions. Just
a few of the related questions are: (1) What would have happened if the

Court-packing plan had succeeded? (2) Would Justice Van Devanter have
retired if Roberts had held firm? (3) Would the existence of a Justice Robin-

85. One of the subtexts of the constitutional law course that students often find intrigumg is Cluef Justice Marshall's ability to confront the political branches m ways that gave
them no opportunity to respond. This is, of course, most obvious with respect to the assertion
m Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) of the power to review the actions of
the executive branch and Congress, without affording those branches an opportunity to ignore
any judicial order. A similar potential legal confrontation of this order was avoided m Dred
Scott v Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) by the Court's ill-advised attempt to take
the slavery issue out of the authority of any branch of the national government. This attempt
to prevent confrontations about slavery within the federal government unfortunately contributed to the need to settle the matter through war. In the mid-1930s, however, the political
branches went beyond the usual practice by repeatedly passing regulatory legislation that
challenged the Court's doctrines and by threatening to change the make-up of the Court if it
persisted m its views. Coincidentally or not, Justice Roberts changed his mind, and that was
enough to change the doctrines.
86. The most obvious change was Justice Black's replacement of Justice Van Devanter.
However, the death of Senate Majority Leader Robinson was also important because if he had
lived, the Court-packing plan might well have passed, and his appointment to the Court might
have kept Hugo Black in the Senate. If the Court-packing plan had been m force in the
1980s, the elderly Court of that era would have been larger or very different. In either event,
President Reagan would have been able to name additional justices in the early 1980s for
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, who instead were replaced in the 1990s by
Presidents Bush and Clinton.
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son have meant a moderately conservative Court for the next few years,
delaying (or possibly even preventing) some of the key doctrinal changes of
the late 1930s? (4) Would his appointment have meant that there never
would have been a Justice Black? Put simply, Leuchtenburg's theme and his
various stones can reinvigorate the part of the basic constitutional law course
that needs it the most, and it can do so without tnvializmg either the law or
the history
V Telling Stones
The Supreme Court Reborn also raises questions about storytelling in
legal scholarship. Recent years have witnessed an extraordinary increase in
the use of storytelling and narrative in legal scholarship and, perhaps more
tellingly, an extraordinary increase in discussion of the use of storytelling
and narrative in legal scholarship.
The stones in The Supreme Court Reborn differ from most contemporary examples of storytelling. The book is largely about actual people who
differ greatly from the author, while most of the new legal narratives are
autobiographical or use fictitious characters (or use fictitious characters to
reveal autobiographical facts). Moreover, most modem narratives are by
and about those who have been underrepresented in our nation's power
centers, usually by reason of race, gender, or social class. Narratives about
the underrepresented perform a valuable function in helping to reveal to
generally upper-class academics a side of life and of the law's impact on that
group that is usually hidden from them. To the best of my knowledge,
however, there has never been a book or a law review article that tells the
story of growing up as the first-born son of a Wall Street securties lawyer,
and if I ever find one, I will not want to read it.' The reason is obvious "I Was a Yuppie Securities Lawyer" will not tell the upper class anything
that it does not know already, and it will not tell the rest of society anything
new either because such yuppies and their fathers already write most of the
laws, opinions, newspaper stones, and television scripts in our society
Despite their value in providing perspectives, however, some of these
legal inherent in anything autobiographical in nature. It is not an accident
that autobiography is sometimes thought of as a subspecies of fiction rather
than of history
87 There is a long tradition of books about poor white males succeeding through hard
work - the Horatio Alger genre. A modem example would be Dallas Cowboy Coach Barry
Switzer's autobiography, Bootlegger's Boy, which recounts his difficult rise. BARRY
SWITZER & BUD SHRAKE, BOOTLEGGER's BOY (1990). The newer narratives, m a sense,
expand this tradition to include women and persons of color.
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Leuchtenburg's stones avoid these problems. The most obvious reason

is that Ins book is not autobiographical. Had it been about the influences of
Supreme Court doctrine on the lives of lstory professors, it would probably
be as bad as any "Yuppie Securities" autobiography would be. But Leuchtenburg honors a norm of historical scholarslp - getting inside historical
situations without writing about himself.' At the same time, he honors one
of the chief norms of the new legal narratives by writing about those who are
not powerful. Both Elsie Parrish, "the Wenatchee Chambermaid," and
Carrie Buck were essentially powerless. The essays tell us facts about these
people that the Court's opinions ignored, and this approach iroically emphasizes the impact of the legal system on their lives. Elsie Parrish was one
of many thousands of people who had a demanding job and could not support herself on subpar wages.'

She sought the legal minimum wage only

88. Federal appeals judge Michael Boudin argues that "[h]istonans prize objectivity and
honesty
The discipline [of law] teaches argument, not objective narration." Michael
Boudin, The Master Craftsman, 47 STAN. L. REV 363, 381 (1995) (reviewing GERALD
GUNTHMR, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)). See generally id. at 380-86
(contrasting historical and legal writing).
Judge Boudin may be overconfident m the ability of historians to view "facts"
objectively. Historians have to deal with the challenge of finding the "right" mixture of fairness and subjectivity and are therefore well aware that what they write is not indisputable
fact. See, e.g., EDWARD H. CARR, WHAT Is HISTORY9 13 (First Vintage Books ed. 1967)
(noting that historians' "facts" are judgments, not facts (quoting GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH,
HISTORY IN A CHANGING WORLD 14 (1955)); JOHN HIGHAM ET AL., HISTORY: THE

DEVELOPmENT OF HISTORICAL STUDmS INTHE UNITED STATES 89 (1965) (noting that history
is written by winners from inevitably biased vantage points). The conventional wisdom of
every era rewrites the history that it tells. Frances Fitzgerald's study of secondary school
history texts traces the change from an orthodoxy about American virtue and melting pots to
a newer one that acknowledges unpleasant truths about our nation's past but tends toward an
uncritical celebration of diversity, a central "truth" of this era. FRANCES FITZGERALD,
AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS INTHE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1st ed. 1979).
The conflict over the objective-subjective balance in history has seen various schools
and dominant theories. As Higham explains, "historical theory m America has moved within
a circle of confidence and doubt." HIGHAM ET AL., supra, at 90. The dominant strains of
the post-World War II period have confidence in the value of historical knowledge and the
need "to get close" to the period under study. Historians must be able "to participate subjectively in whatever past they wish to understand." Id. at 143; see also CARR, supra, at 2627 (noting that historians need to understand values and culture that they portray).
In this sense, historians tend to be more open than legal scholars about the potential influence of personal outlook. History texts tend to have names like "The March of American
Progress." Constitutional law casebooks, wich all seem to imply that their course is the
march of American progress, are almost all called "Constitutional Law." See supra note 17
(listing names of constitutional law textbooks).
89. See LEUCHTENBuRG, supra note 1, at 164.

1720

52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1699 (1995)

after she quit, the unplication being that she would have been fired had she

sought the increase earlier.' ° Carrie Buck was treated as less than a person
based on bad science and worse law 91 Leuchtenburg also writes about
people such as William Humphrey and Hugo Black, who were hardly
dispossessed members of society However, those who read only the
Supreme Court opinon do not know the real story behind President Roose-

velt's firing of Humphrey

As far as the Court intimates, he was just a

republican member of the Federal Trade Commission whom President Roo-

sevelt wanted to replace. Knowing Humphrey's background and what would
today be called Ins "management style" does not make him more sympa-

thetic, but it, at least, would put Roosevelt's action into context. 2 The Black
nomination story is different. Although the story is very well known,
Leuchtenburg still manages to make it fresh, largely through his skill at
shaping a narrative and his heavy reliance on primary sources and facts
rather than conclusory statements.9"

This last point denotes a difference between legal and ustoncal narratives. All too often, stones in legal scholarship seem to state conclusions
rather than facts. 94 Historians and social scientists are more inclined to find
90. See id. at 178-79.
91. Seeid.at5-11.
92. The fact that Humphrey was such a partisan figure makes the fact that the Court
unanimously invalidated his firing even more striking. See id. at 70-78. It is apparent that
even those justices most deferential to executive authority also believed strongly m the mdependence of agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, from the President and the
consequent need to enforce strictly the limitations on the President's power to remove comnssioners from office. The fact that Humphrey died before the case was resolved, rendering
the dispute ultimately to be about backpay, however, may, to some degree, undercut this
conclusion. See id. at 62-64.
93. The book is full of sections that lay out facts simply but in dense detail. Two that
are particularly noteworthy are Leuchtenburg's discussion of the eugenics movement, id. at
5-9, and his contrapuntal discussions about the Court's decisions hostile to the New Deal and
the Roosevelt administration's machinations to get around the problem, id. at 85-108. The
fact that Leuchtenburg has an "agenda" m both of these sections is neither inappropriate nor
detracts from their impact. A reader must just remember what is obvious from the work as
a whole - that Leuchtenburg supports the Court's switch of 1937
94. Higham describes the New History Movement's attempt to come closer to reality
by using specific details rather than generalizations that merely abstract from experience. See
HIGHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 106-10. A statement such as 'we were poor" really says
very little; "our house had no floor" says a good bit more (as does the B.C. comic strip of
July 11, 1995 - "My alibi in school used to be: 'a cockroach ate my homework.'" Johnny
Hart, B.C., Creators Syndicate, Inc. (1995)). Legal scholars tend toward generalizations for
some reason, perhaps because of our traditional reliance on appellate opinions, which are
almost always conclusory and which reduce facts to a few findings.
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the facts m primary sources and then reorganize them for the reader. To be
sure, there is manipulation and argument m what they do as well, but they
usually provide enough specifics that readers have a basis upon which to
accept or reject their arguments.
Other aspects of Leuchtenburg's success m telling constitutional law
stories are suggested by another recent book, ConstitutionalLaw as Fiction.95 The underlying theme of this book is that law is based on fictional
stories rather than on actual "facts," and cases are "restatements" of events
intended to create a particular legend. The legend then becomes the legal
understanding of the case - the "facts" that future generations learn and
themselves pass along.' The author, law professor Lewis H. LaRue, criticizes the way in which we tell stones and presents his own counter-theory,
using as an example Norman Maclean's Young Men and Fire.7 Although
LaRue finds several lessons for lawyers, as well as other writers, in this
book, two stand out - increasing accuracy in detail and using foreshadowing."8
Leuchtenburg's stones meet LaRue's injunction by paying close attention to detaif and by employing structures that foreshadow their conclusions.
The stories about cases are filled with details that he found in lower court
records and testimony; the political stories are filled with quotations from
memos, interviews, and contemporary newspaper accounts. Most modem
readers will be appalled by the eugemcs movement and what happened to
Came Buck, but by providing so many details, Leuchtenburg makes it
95. L.H. LARuE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICrION: NARRATIVE INTHE RHETORiC OF
AUTHoRrry (1995).
96. LaRue's book identifies several examples of such judicial mythmakmg. One
example is the history of religion m the United States, which was falsely told by Justice Black
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See LARUE, supra note 95, at 16-27 This
history becomes Justice Powell's erroneous history of religion in Edwards v Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987). See LARUE, supra note 95, at 32-33. Two of the basic fictional constitutional law stones that LaRue identifies are the story of constitutional limits, which is first told
m Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and the story of our nation's
inevitable growth, which is suggested by McCulloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819). See LARuE, supra note 95, at 42-92.
97 NORMAN MACLEAN, YOUNG MEN AND FIE (1992) (relating true story of Mann
Gulch Fire).
98. The last 25 pages of ConstitutionalLaw as Fiction are LaRue's attempt to show
lawyers how to tell stones, drawing on Maclean's Young Men and Fire. See LARuE, supra
note 95, at 129-53. His emphasis on accuracy in detail is implicit in much of this section and
relates to the need to give factual specificity - a workable image - to the pertinent

questions. Id. at 146. He sees foreshadowing as a valuable means to increase dramatic
tension. Id. at 132, 135-36.
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possible for us to evaluate Buck v Bell in the context of its time and to
appreciate the societal changes and enhanced scientific knowledge that have

made its holding anachronistic. Further, by ordering the chapters and structuring the individual essays so as to underscore the "fall of the old and rise
of the new," The Supreme Court Reborn enhances the overriding story of a
Court and a nation m peaceful constitutional revolution." In Leuchtenburg's
words, "no event has had more momentous consequences" than the attempt
to pack the Court."0

Iromcally, but perhaps logically, the least convincing - the most skimmable - portions of The Supreme Court Reborn are the summaries of the
Court's opinion holdings. Whether this irony results because Leuchtenburg
is not a lawyer or because we have been spoiled by case summaries written
by people who write such things for a living does not matter. LaRue tells
us to write about what is "strange or wonderful,"10 ' and Supreme Court

opinions are rarely strange or wonderful to lawyers. Leuchtenburg's stones,
however, are strange and wonderful to us and provide a richness to consti-

tutional law study
Good legal history is as much history as it is law Because the root of

"history" is "story," perhaps we lawyers should recognize that we have a lot
to learn from the professional storytellers when we try to rely on their art.

99. A good example of effective foreshadowing is the final sentence of the essay on
Justice Roberts and Alton: "From that day forward, neither Roosevelt nor his aides would rest
until they had found a way to overcome the obstacle to their plans presented by the Court."
LEUCHTENEURG, supra note 1, at 51. Leuchtenburg's alternating between Court decisions
and administrative plotting in the first Court-packing essay is also particularly effective
stagecraft. This discussion is paced somewhat like a suspense movie. If Stephen Sondhetm
were to rework it for the theater, the opposing groups would be singing songs attesting to
their ability to win the "rumble," much like the Jets and Sharks in his WEST SIDE STORY
(United Artists 1961) (music by Leonard Bernstein).
100. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 162.
101. LARUE, supra note 95, at 150 (quoting from MACLEAN, supra note 97).
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